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EXPROPRIATION
Melvin G. Dakin*
AUTHORITY TO TAKE AND NATURE OF THE INTEREST TAKEN
In Terrebonne v. South Louisiana Tidal Water Control Levee District,'
the first circuit decided, somewhat anomalously,2 that only procedural
rights were conferred upon landowners with appropriation claims pend-
ing on July 10, 1978, when the legislature directed the payment of fair
market value for servitudes taken from these riparian owners for levee
purposes.' The second circuit, in Pillow v. Board of Commissioners,'
subsequently rejected this reasoning and held that the legislature, in ex-
tending its directive to such pending appropriation suits, conferred substan-
tive rights on the claimants. This court held that the omission of this
extension in Act 676 of 1979 could not take away the rights which had
vested by virtue of Act 314 of 1978.'
The limitation on the exercise of expropriation power by electric
utilities6 was interpreted in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Caldwell'
and in Southwestern Electric Power Co. v. Tally8 to require utilities to
plead and prove that a proposed taking does not interfere "more than
is necessary" with the convenience of the landowner; however, only the
location of the servitude to be taken was in issue in these cases. During
last term, in Southwest Louisiana Electric Membership Corp. v. Duck,9
a landowner sought to go beyond mere protest of the location of the
servitude and, in effect, requested a showing that size, location and sup-
porting piers of the transmission lines to be constructed on the servitude
also did not interfere "more than is necessary" with landowner conven-
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. 414 So. 2d 805 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
2. Id. at 816; see also id. at 816-17 (Shortess, J., dissenting).
3. 1978 La. Acts, No. 314, § 1.
4. 425 So. 2d 1267 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 427 So. 2d 1199 (La. 1983).
5. Id. at 1276. There is no mention of the caveat in the legislation that owners shall
be compensated at fair market value "only when and if, in its discretion, the Louisiana
Legislature, the levee board, or the federal government, appropriates the funds therefor."
LA. R.S. 38:281(B)(1) (Supp. 1983). In light of the conflict in the circuits, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has granted writs of certiorari and will perhaps appraise the significance
of this provision on the vesting of rights under Act 314 of 1978. Terrebonne v. South La.
Tidal Water Control Levee Dist., 414 So. 2d 805 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), cert. granted,
427 So. 2d 1199 (La. 1983); Pillow v. Board of Comm'rs, 425 So. 2d 1267 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 427 So. 2d 1200 (La. 1983).
6. LA. R.S. 19:2(7) (1979).
7. 360 So. 2d 848 (La. 1978).
8. 377 So. 2d 364 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
9. 418 So. 2d 38 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
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ience. The trial court order to produce such data was reversed by the
third circuit on the ground that the statute requires only a showing that
the location of the servitude interferes no more than is necessary with
owner convenience; to require more, the court said, would bring under
judicial scrutiny details of construction not contemplated by the statute. °
That cable television has expropriation power was further butressed
in Edward J. Gay Planting & Manufacturing Co. v. Bayou Cable Tele-
vision." Failing in negotiations with a landowner to obtain a servitude
for cable within the servitude already granted to the Louisiana Depart-
ment of Highways, Bayou Cable proceeded to install its cable with only
departmental permission. In a suit by the landowner to compel removal,
Bayou Cable filed a reconventional demand seeking expropriation of a
servitude. In dismissing the demand for expropriation and ordering
removal, the trial court relied upon implied legislative denial of expropria-
tion rights to cable companies in imposing a requirement of owner con-
sent, in addition to consent of the servitude holder, where cable was to
be laid within a servitude of the Department of Highways.' 2 Since owner
consent had previously been held to be an implicit requirement in creating
such a second servitude,' 3 the first circuit held that the legislative action
merely made such consent statutorily explicit; it had no bearing on the
expropriation power implicitly granted to cable companies as "[c]orpora-
tions . . . formed for the purpose of transmitting intelligence by telegraph
or telephone or other system of transmitting intelligence.""' Expropria-
tion was ordered to continue as requested in the reconventional demand.' 5
In Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Holmes," an appeals court found
the trial court in error in classifying a right of way for electric lines as
a legal servitude,' 7 holding that a servitude validly acquired under the St.
Julien doctrine constituted a limited personal servitude governed by Civil
Code article 651. The owner of the servient estate was hence required
"to keep his estate in suitable condition for the exercise of the servitude
due to the dominant estate."' 8 The utility was held to be entitled to in-
10. Id. at 40. The owner would seem not without remedy, however, since "size, loca-
tion, and supporting piers" of lines to be constructed would clearly bear on the utility
remaining to the owner in the servitude and, hence, on the quantum of compensation and
damages recoverable. See M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, EMINENT DOMAIN IN LOUISIANA 49-50
(1970), 23-25 (Supp. 1978).
11. 423 So. 2d 58 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
12. LA. R.S. 48:381 (Supp. 1983).
13. Koch v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 298 So. 2d 124 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
14. LA. R.S. 45:781 (1982).
15. 423 So. 2d at 61.
16. 422 So. 2d 684 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
17. Id. at 686. The taking antedated Lake, Inc. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 330
So. 2d 914 (La. 1976). See Dakin, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Expropriation,
42 LA. L. Ray. 556 (1982).
18. LA. CIv. CODE art. 651, quoted in Holmes, 422 So. 2d at 688.
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junctive relief precluding the servient estate owner from construction which
would constitute an obstacle to maintenance of the electric lines. 9
In United States v. Security Industrial Bank0 the threat of a "tak-
ing" was alleged to be contained in language of the new bankruptcy code2'
permitting a debtor to avoid a pre-existing lien on household and profes-
sional items as to which exemption had been waived. In order to avoid
invalidating the provision under the fifth amendment, the United States
Supreme Court invoked the principle that "[n]o bankruptcy law shall be
construed to eliminate property rights which existed before the law was
enacted in the absence of an explicit command from Congress." 22 The
Court then found that Congress "may not have intended that [the provi-
sion] operate to destroy pre-enactment property rights." '23
An appeals court has recently concluded, contrary to 1969 dicta of
the Louisiana Supreme Court, 24 that a railroad, although vested with a
public interest, is nonetheless a private property owner and is entitled to
compensation for a highway right of way servitude expropriated from it. 25
In State v. Illinois Central Gulf Railway Co.26 the first circuit concluded
that statutes dealing with highway crossings of railways are relevant only
as to allocating the cost of building and maintaining such crossings and
do not legislatively announce a railroad right of way to be public
property. 7 The court further concluded that the 1974 constitution29
superceded a provision of the 1921 constitution2 9 relied upon to establish
the status of such property as "public." 3
DAMAGES-VALUATION
The Uniform Eminent Domain Code3' recommends that "[i]f there
is a partial taking of property, the fair market value of the remainder
on the valuation date shall reflect increases or decreases in value caused
by the proposed project . . . [and] . . . as of the date of valuation, shall
19. 422 So. 2d at 690.
20. 103 S. Ct. 407 (1982).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0(2) (Supp. V 1981).
22. 103 S. Ct. at 414; see Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 637 (1914).
23. 103 S. Ct. at 414. An early rejected version of the provision specifically applied
to "all cases," thus carrying an implication of retroactivity. Id.
24. Kansas City So. Ry. v. Louisiana Public Serv. Comm'n, 254 La. 160, 223 So.
2d 132 (1969).
25. State v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 428 So. 2d 1136 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
26. Id.
27. LA. R.S. 45:841, :382 (1982 & Supp. 1983); the latter was also deemed to have
superceded the former.
28. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
29. LA. CONST. of 1921, art. XIII, § 3.
30. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 16-17.
31. 13 U.L.A. 11 (1980).
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reflect the time the damage or benefit caused by the proposed im-
provements or project will be actually realized." 3 In State v. Wells,"
the Louisiana Supreme Court held this was also the import of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 48:453, which somewhat cryptically provided that
"[d]amage to the remainder of the property is determined as of the date
of the trial." The court noted that this language must be read in light
of Louisiana Revised Statutes 48:451(1), providing that the landowner could
file suit after the completion of the project, if he chose to do so, thus
permitting a more accurate appraisal of damage or special benefits resulting
from the project.14 Nonetheless, in State v. Harris," another unsuccessful
attempt was made to have all the severance damages determined after
project completion. 6
In Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line v. Terrell,37 the first circuit again
approved the percentage method of calculating the severance damages in
the taking of a servitude for a gas pipeline, noting that applicable law
is adhered to if there is an overall valuation before and after the taking
and a deduction for the value of the servitude from the overall diminu-
tion in value, thus clearly identifying severance damages. The court men-
tioned that offers to purchase by the expropriator might be some evidence
of fair market value but carefully noted that there was more than suffi-
cient evidence of comparable sales to support the expert opinion relied
upon. 8
The federal government's acquisition of sites for stockpiling petroleum
in Louisiana brought to the federal courts what was described in United
States v. 131.68 Acres of Land, as "the age-old legal problem of how
to measure damages for the destruction of crops." '39 In this case the Fifth
Circuit noted that, while state law dictated the characterization of grow-
ing crops as property, the measure of damages was a matter of federal
law under which the "guiding principle of just compensation . . . is that
the owner 'must be made whole but is not entitled to more."' 4° The for-
mula used by the trial court for measuring damages for loss of a three-
32. UNIF. EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § 1006, 13 U.L.A. 107 (1980).
33. 308 So. 2d 774 (La. 1975).
34. Id. at 776.
35. 423 So. 2d 721 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
36. Id. at 723. The legislature enacted a provision clearly enunciating the procedure
suggested in the Uniform Eminent Domain Code. LA. R:S. 48:453 (Supp. 1983).
37. 416 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
38. Id. at 574. In Housing Authority v. Gondolfo, 208 La. 1065, 24 So. 2d 78 (1945),
the Louisiana Supreme Court treated an offer by expropriator as an admission that the
property was worth not less than the amount the expropriator was willing to pay for the
property.
39. 695 F.2d 871, 872 (5th Cir. 1983).
40. Id. at 875 (quoting United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 516 (1979)
(quoting Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)).
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year sugar cane crop, valuing the standing crop less harvesting costs and
adding thereto two-thirds of the cost of planting the acreage, was deemed
correct. The owner's contention that he was entitled to net profits on
the remaining two potential crops was rejected since he was receiving the
fair market value of the acreage taken as measured by the total value
of the tract before and after the acreage was expropriated. The court
reasoned that "[a]dding compensation for the loss of net profits after
the date of the taking would thus have resulted in double compensation."'
The value of the subject acreage was valued by means of comparable
sales, so there was no further reliance on actuarial techniques."2
In City of Shreveport v. Standard Printing Co., a somewhat novel
dimension was added to the 1974 constitutional provision requiring an
expropriatee to be compensated to the full amount of his economic loss."
An expropriatee successfully maintained that relocation within a downtown
area was essential to preservation of its business. The second circuit agreed
that, as a consequence of the relocation, the replacement cost of the struc-
ture taken must include the cost of improvements required by a city
building code for current construction." The court also found no func-
tional obsolescence or depreciation of the building for the owner's uses
and awarded full undepreciated replacement cost to the expropriatee. The
use of replacement cost was buttressed by evidence in the record that such
cost was substantially less than the value of the structure on a capitalized
net income basis.4 6
In State v. Exxon Corp., a service station lessee was permitted to
intervene in expropriation proceedings against the lessor of the station
and to prove and recover lost profits from diminished sales as a result
of the taking. The lessee was deemed to be included in the language of
the 1974 constitution that an "owner shall be compensated to the full
extent of his loss,""' and he was awarded damages based on profit lost
through diminished sales attributable to the taking up to the time verbal
extension of an original written lease was finally terminated.4 9
41. Id. (footnote omitted). The court did not explain why this was so but evidently
assumed that the fair market value of the commercial acreage taken represented the present
value of future profits to be derived therefrom.
42. See M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, supra note 10, at 222.
43. 427 So. 2d 1304 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
44. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
45. 427 So. 2d at 1307-08.
46. Id. at 1309. In essence, the court accepted the "buy or build" approach when
determining the fair market value of a commercial building. See M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN,
supra note 10, at 240.
47. 430 So. 2d 1191 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
48. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
49. 430 So. 2d at 1195. A verbal extension of the original lease was given the same
effect as a formally executed new lease which was available but refused because of the
19831
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PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
In Boudreaux v. Terrebonne Parish Police Jury,"0 a landowner filed
a suit in trespass and prayed for removal of public works constructed
on his property without his consent, a suit deemed governed by the two-
year prescriptive period provided by Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5624.1
Suit was filed within the three-year period under Louisiana Revised Statutes
13:5111 for actions for recovery of compensation for unauthorized tak-
ings, but a plea for compensation as required by that statute was not
alleged. Had the St. Julien characteristics of the taking been recognized
at the time taking was discovered by the owner and a suit in inverse con-
demnation, rather than for damages, been brought, some compensation
for the value of the servitude should have been recoverable. The suit as
filed was profitless, however, since no damages were suffered within the
immediately preceding two years, and damages incurred prior thereto had
prescribed."
In Succession of Rovira v. Board of Commissioners,3 the board ap-
propriated swamp acreage for construction of a portion of the Mississip-
pi River Gulf Outlet. The co-administrators of the successions of the de-
ceased landowners brought a suit in inverse condemnation for compensa-
tion some twenty years later. The board pleaded prescription ' (as well
as a number of other pleas) in support of dismissal of the suit on the
ground that there had been either actual or constructive notice of the
construction of public works upon the property, thus tolling the prescrip-
tive period. The plea was rejected by the trial court, and, on appeal, re-
jection was affirmed on the trial court's reasoning.
[W]here the aerial photographs of the canal and the surrounding
property show the entire area to be nothing more than inaccessi-
ble swampland and where the property was owned by numerous
heirs who had inherited fractional interests from generations past
and these facts were discernible from the public records, govern-
mental agencies have a greater duty to notify the property owners
directly than were the property located on the suburb of a
metropolitan area and legal advertisements cannot be relied on
under these circumstances."
anticipated effect of construction. The verbal extensions did not vary from the original written
lease.
50. 422 So. 2d 1209 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
51. Under this provision the prescriptive period begins to run when damages from the
public works are sustained.
52. LA. R.S. 9:5624 (1983).
53. 418 So. 2d 1382 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
54. Id. at 1388.
55. Succession of Rovira v. Board of Comm'rs, No. 78-13,645, at 4 (Orl. La. Civ.
Dist. Ct. Oct. 27, 1981), quoted in Succession of Rovira, 418 So. 2d at 1388. The court
[Vol. 44
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The board was thus held liable to pay compensation, but no valuation
date was fixed. On remand the plaintiffs will presumably argue, as did
the landowner in Koerber v. City of New Orleans,6 that the time of ex-
propriation, and hence the date of valuation, is fixed when the expropriator
files an answer asserting the power of expropriation in an inverse con-
demnation suit."
In State v. Ellender," the Louisiana Supreme Court held that judicial
economy will be best served by permitting a tort claim stemming from
damage inflicted by the expropriator (but not directly by the taking) to
be raised by reconventional demand rather than in a separate suit. In
Prentice Oil & Gas Co. v. State,9 an additional dimension was added
to the Ellender holding. Expropriation proceedings were dismissed for non-
compliance with statutory requirements and judgment had become final.6"
However, the deposit in the registry of the court was ordered retained
to satisfy any judgment for damages and attorneys' fees which might
thereafter be obtained by the landowner. A suit in tort followed in which
the owner recovered for an array of injuries stemming from the dismissed
expropriation proceeding. Satisfying the judgment in tort out of a registry
deposit made as a potential compensation award was held not to violate
the constitutional proscription against seizure of public funds6' since the
funds deposited had been expressly reserved for this purpose. If Prentice
Oil is upheld, the "judicial economy" supporting the Ellender decision,
as well as legislative economy, will be served since in cases of dismissal
where, as here, no reconventional demand is feasible, legislative appropria-
tion would otherwise be required to satisfy a related judgment in tort.62
In Mills v. State, 3 the state relied on its police power in limiting a
landowner's access to a state highway to one of the three access ways
which he had previously enjoyed from his property. The second circuit
held this limitation to be such a substantial interference with the property
cited Cartwright v. Chrysler, 255 La. 598, 232 So. 2d 285 (1970), where, in dictum, the
Louisiana Supreme Court noted that it had accepted the common law doctrine that prescription
will not run against one who is ignorant of facts that would entitle him to bring suit where
ignorance is not willful and does not result from negligence. 255 La. at 603, 232 So. 2d
at 287. Other limitations on the doctrine were not alluded to.
56. 228 La. 903, 84 So. 2d 454 (1955).
57. 228 La. at 907, 84 So. 2d at 456; see also M. DAKIN & M. KLaN, supra note
10, at 164-65 (1970), 57 (Supp. 1978).
58. 379 So. 2d 1069 (La. 1980); see Dakin, Developments in the Law,
1979-1980-Expropriation, 41 LA. L. REV. 474, 479-80 (1981).
59. 421 So. 2d 937 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
60. Id. at 938.
61. LA. CONST. art XII, § 10(c).
62. Id.
63. 416 So. 2d 957 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
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rights of an abutting owner as to require the state to expropriate and
make compensation.6
In United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Becnel,61 the fourth circuit affirmed
a trial court's holding that the highest and best use of property located
near a deep water area of the Mississippi river was industrial. The poten-
tial industrial status of the property was deemed established by expert
testimony that small acreages could potentially be assembled with other
nearby tracts to create an industrial site for which an informed buyer
would pay the prevailing prices, appropriately discounted for difficulties
incident to assemblage. Severance damages were deemed proven with legal
certainty by expert testimony that such property would suffer a twenty
percent decline in value when encumbered with a pipeline servitude. 6
It is well-established in Louisiana that a trial court is "not at liberty
to substitute its own appraisal for those of expert witnesses, when those
appraisals are well-reasoned and are not contradicted." 67 Thus, in State
v. Allen,68 a trial court was held to have committed manifest error in
substituting its own judgment for qualified expert witnesses on the ground
that the court was better informed."
64. The deprivation of access was likened to attempted appropriation of a servitude
which could properly be prevented by bringing a possessory action even though suit in inverse
condemnation might be more conservative of judicial resources. Id. at 960.
65. 417 So. 2d 1198 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
66. A dissenting judge was of the view that, while potential assemblage of property
for industrial sites was a legitimate consideration in the valuation of property (although
res nova in Louisiana), no reasonable probability had been established that the assemblage
could be accomplished. The evidence of severance damage was also suspect as speculative
since some of the tracts were already burdened with pipeline servitudes. In State v. Goldsby,
427 So. 2d 580 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983), taking of a mere highway servitude was held
to diminish the value of industrial property by only two percent.
67. State v. Goudeau, 276 So. 2d 923, 925 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
68. 422 So. 2d 1368 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
69. The testimony of an owner and a purchaser contradicting expert testimony as to
the value before taking was rejected where no expert qualifications were established and
no basis for their opinion was introduced in evidence. Id. at 1370.
